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A three-judge Court in the Southern District of New York, 418 F. 277, granted relief and state and city officials appealed. Justice Brennan, held that removal procedures under which foster parents were given ten days' advanced notice of removal, were permitted to request a preremoval conference with the social services department, and were entitled to full adversary administrative hearing, subject to judicial review, following the conference with no stay of removal pending the hearing and judicial review, and under which preremoval judicial review was provided with respect to children who have been in foster care for 18 months or more afforded sufficient due process protection to any liberty interests involved. NATURE OF CASE: Stepfather of illegitimate child petitioned to adopt the child. FN3 Appellants appealed to this Court, arguing that the termination order and the Delaware statute authorizing it were unconstitutional. NATURE OF CASE: The District Court, Durham County, Samuel F. [top] *Articles with an asterisk indicate a link to a website maintained by a third party and unaffiliated with the Idaho Supreme Court.

The Superior Court, Fulton County, granted adoption, and natural father appealed. Gantt, J., terminated a mother's parental rights and appeal was taken.

The District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, Boise County, Kathryn A. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, Saundra B.

Sticklen, J., reversed the decision of the magistrate and vacated order granting potential adoptive parents permission to intervene. Armstrong, J.,2008 WL 114910, granted summary judgment for defendants, and subsequently, 2008 WL 786862, denied leave to file motion for reconsideration. Holdings: The Court of Appeals, held that: (1) officer reasonably relied upon girl's statements in finding that she was in imminent danger of abuse, as required to remove her from parents' custody without prior judicial authorization; (2) officer had reasonable cause to believe that risk of harm was imminent; (3) officer acted reasonably in removing girl from mother's custody; (4) factual issues precluded summary judgment on father's due process claim on grounds that no violation occurred; (5) officer was entitled to qualified immunity on father's due process claim; and (6) factual issues precluded summary judgment for county.

There was no merit in any of Parents’ evidentiary contentions--specifically, that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule does not apply to child protection proceedings; that Parents failed to show a violation of Father’s Fifth Amendment Miranda rights; that even if the court were to apply Brady to CPA proceedings, Parents have not demonstrated that the undisclosed evidence was favorable, suppressed by the Department, and prejudice resulted; and that the magistrate did not err in admitting photographs of the older children’s injuries. NATURE OF CASE: Department of Health and Welfare filed petition to terminate parental rights of mother and mother's boyfriend, who had been ordered to pay child support after being deemed child's “legal father.” The Magistrate Court, Fourth Judicial District, Ada County, Carolyn Minder, Magistrate Judge, terminated mother's parental rights and terminated boyfriend's “legal father” status. Holdings: The Supreme Court held that: (1) mother's boyfriend, who was not child's biological or adoptive father, was not a “parent” of child for purposes termination of parental rights proceedings; (2) assuming child support order precluded Department from relitigating issue of paternity, Department would be required to prove statutory ground for termination of parental rights; and (3) termination of parental rights proceedings did not provide basis for terminating whatever relationship existed between child and a person who was not a parent. NATURE OF CASE: County prosecutor's office filed petitions under the Child Protective Act (CPA) in connection with son and daughter after son was hospitalized for injuries inflicted by father, and children were placed in shelter care and foster care. Eventually the wife failed to follow her case plan, and as a result IDHW moved to terminate her rights to the child. The Supreme Court, Justice Stewart, held that failure to appoint counsel for indigent parents in proceeding for termination of parental status did not deprive parent of due process in light of circumstances which included that petition contained no allegations upon which criminal charges could be based, no expert witnesses testified, case presented no specially troublesome points of law, and presence of counsel could not have made a determinative difference for petitioner; such decision does not imply that appointment of counsel is other than enlightened and wise. NATURE OF CASE: Parents appealed from judgment of the Family Court, Ulster County, Elwyn, J., which adjudged their children to be permanently neglected. The Family Court, Ulster County, 102 Misc.2d 102, 423 N. Aiken, J., 2006 WL 758547, granted summary judgment for defendants. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Berzon, Circuit Judge, 588 F.3d 1011, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. Holdings: The Supreme Court, Justice Kagan, held that: (1) Supreme Court has authority to review an immunized official's challenge to a constitutional ruling; (2) the case was moot; and (3) the appropriate disposition was to vacate the part of the court of appeals' opinion that addressed the Fourth Amendment issue.

Finally, the court concludes that that magistrate did not err in concluding that based on the circumstances, there was evidence of abuse to establish the court’s jurisdiction over A. Following adjudicatory hearing, the District Court, Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County, Bryan Kenneth Murray, Magistrate, entered order vesting legal custody of children in the Department of Health and Welfare (DHW) and subsequently ordered extended home visit with mother. Holdings: (1) magistrate court met minimum requirements in child protection proceeding for notifying mother of her right to counsel at shelter care hearings; (2) magistrate court had jurisdiction over minor son based on father's abuse of son, despite absence of allegations that mother abused, neglected, or abandoned son; and (3) magistrate court acted within bounds of its discretion by taking jurisdiction over daughter; but (4) magistrate court abused its discretion by vesting legal custody of children in DHW after adjudicatory hearing, instead of placing children in mother's care under protective supervision of DHW. NATURE OF CASE: The Idaho Department of Health and Welfare (IDHW) filed a petition to terminate mother and father's parental rights to their two children. IDHW also moved to terminate the parental rights of John Doe, claiming that he has willfully abandoned the child. Justice Marshall held that: (1) natural father's substantive rights under due process clause were not violated by application of the best interests of the child standard where natural father had not petitioned for legitimation at any time in 11-year period between birth and filing of adoption petition, child had always been in mother's custody and adoption petition was filed over eight years after mother married and (2) equal protection principles did not require that natural father's authority to veto an adoption be measured by the same standard as applied to a divorced father since the state was not foreclosed from recognizing the difference in extent of commitment to a child's welfare between that of an unwed father who has never shouldered any significant responsibility for the child's rearing and that of a divorced father who at least will have borne some full responsibility for the child's rearing. NATURE OF CASE: Appellants, a half brother and sister, are the natural parents of five children who were in the custody of the Division of Social Services of the Delaware Department of Health and Social Services at the beginning of this litigation. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, 75 A. Opinion of Court of Appeals vacated in part; remanded.

Lodge, J., which found that father's consent to pending adoption was not required.

NATURE OF CASE: In proceedings to place children in permanent foster care, the First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County, Gary M. The Supreme Court, Justice Powell, held that: (1) defendant was entitled to have Pennsylvania Children and Youth Services file reviewed by trial court to determine whether it contained information that probably would have changed outcome of trial, and (2) defense counsel was not entitled to examine confidential information in Children and Youth Services file.

If you're just talking about going to dinner or to a football game, no problem.

The age of legal sexual consent is 16, but the state retains the right to apply other laws pertaining to relationships between adults and minors, confusing to say the least.\n.

Haman, J., affirmed order of Robert Burton, Magistrate Judge, placing children in permanent foster care, and natural parents appealed. Furthermore, Justice Powell, with the Chief Justice and two other Justices concurring, and one Justice concurring in result, held that failure to disclose Children and Youth Services file did not violate the confrontation clause.

The Court of Appeals, Perry, J., held that: (1) magistrate was not required to make threshold determination as to level of participation necessary for guardian ad litem to adequately represent children; (2) letter written by child to judge expressing concerns at being returned to parents was admissible; (3) error in admitting hearsay report of guardian was harmless; and (4) evidence supported finding that special needs of children required permanent foster care. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The Supreme Court, Justice Scalia, held that: (1) California statute creating presumption that child born to married woman living with her husband is child of the marriage did not violate putative natural father's procedural due process rights; (2) statute did not violate putative natural father's substantive due process rights; (3) child did not have due process right to maintain filial relationship with both putative natural father and husband; and (4) statute did not violate child's equal protection rights. NATURE OF CASE: Parents and their children brought action against city and others, alleging that their constitutional and state-law rights were violated when police officers removed children from parents and had them subjected to invasive medical examinations based in part on mental patient's statements that father intended to ritually sacrifice his son to Satan.

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